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Introduction
China’s ascendance on the world stage signals
a major shift in the global political, economic,
and security environment. The ability of the US
and EU to deal effectively with the challenges
associated with China’s rise have far-reaching
consequences both for transatlantic relations and
for the effective management of China’s global
emergence and the world order. The Bush ad-
ministration’s China policy appears still contested
and the future of Sino-American relations highly
uncertain. China has not already become the
world’s 4th economy and 3rd exporter, but also
an increasingly important political power (total
external trade now more than three times the
combined trade of India and Brazil). In this
context, it is not surprising that competition and
rivalries within the strategic triangle are growing.
While ambivalence has always characterized the
complex US-China relations, increasing frictions
in a number of political and economic fields is
rather a new development within the EU-China
relations during the last 12-18 months.
In this respect, EU-China relations are at a cross-
roads at a time when the EU and its member
states are seeking ways to overcome the rifts of
the Iraq conflict with the United States. Partly
as a result of the enlargement processes, the
EU became the largest trading partner of the
PRC in 2004 and China became the second-larg-
est trade partner of the EU, second only to the
USA. Since 1978, the bilateral trade volume has
increased 30-fold, reaching 148 billion euros in
2003. Germany is by far the largest EU exporter
to China, conducting no less than 44 per cent of
the EU’s total trade with China. But although
the expansion of the bilateral trade is a success
story in its own right, it simultaneously also un-
dermined the implementation of a more effec-
tive CFSP towards China, both in a material and
a normative context. The growing economic ties
and interdependency have strategic conse-
quences for the political relationship between
the EU and China, and also for the transatlantic
relationship. They will eventually have to address
more potentially divisive transnational and re-
gional issues outside Europe, including the rela-
tionship with Asia and China. While China is still
vying for a “multi-polar world,” the EU and its
member states are implementing their CFSP
step-by-step, as well as their ESDP. Yet despite
the European Security Concept, the main mem-
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ber states of the EU (notably France and
Germany) had still defined their policies on China
largely by their economic and trade interests until
the summer of 2005. Therefore, they have of-
ten ignored the EU’s long-term security inter-
ests in the Asia-Pacific as outlined in numerous
EU and national foreign policy documents on
China.
Since the promulgation of its guidelines for a
Comprehensive Partnership with China on 29
June 1998 and its Asia Strategy paper of Sep-
tember 2001, the EU has struggled for a
coherent, comprehensive and balanced China
policy based on a long-term strategy that re-
flects China’s growing economic and political
weight at the regional and global level, as well
as the EU’s interest to implement its own CFSP.
Since the year 2000, the EU’s assistance pro-
grammes for China have also included its WTO
accession, the fight against illegal immigration
and trafficking in human beings, social security
reform, the telecommunication/information
society, the environment, energy, and human
resource development.
In contrast to the European Commission, the
European Parliament (EP) has repeatedly criti-
cized the Europe’s official and unofficial policies
on Taiwan and Tibet. In the 2002 Implementa-
tion Report on the EC’s China Strategy Paper of
1998, the EP had already crit ic ized the
statement: “China reserves the right to use mili-
tary force in its disputes with Taiwan.” The EP
has also expressed concern over China’s identi-
fication of the USA as its principal threat in its
defence white paper of October 2000 and over
the fact that it “has supported regional group-
ings which exclude the US, rather than pan-Pa-
cific ones, even setting up its own version of
Davos at Bao on Hainan Island, to which no
Americans were invited.”
Meanwhile, the trade imbalance has also sparked
calls for a tougher approach in the EU’s China
policies. Europe’s textiles’ industry has particu-
larly urged to crack down on cheap imports of
Chinese products by imposing anti-dumping du-
ties on clothes and leather shoes. Furthermore,
China’s total FDI in 2004 was just  3 bn (but
increasing rapidly) with a strong focus on secur-
ing access to natural resources. But Europe only
receives a fraction of 2% of this.
In the future, EU-China relations will increas-
ingly be affected by global policy challenges aris-
ing outside China and Europe. Hence the EU, as
well as China, will have to assume more respon-
sibilities for global political and economic
stability, such as an increasing engagement in
regional security in the Middle East and Central
Asia. However, the national interests of both
sides may grow further apart, given China’s and
the EU’s growing energy demands and,
subsequently, their increasing economic depend-
ence on these politically highly volatile regions.
The strategic interests of both the EU and China
concerning their access to energy resources
make them more interested in the maintenance
of political stability in these regions. Conse-
quently, the growing inter-regional energy in-
terdependencies between Europe and China re-
quire common EU-China strategies vis-à-vis this
“arc of instability.”?
Meanwhile, in the process of a newly emerging
“strategic triangle” between the USA, the EU and
China, Beijing has also tried to deepen the rift
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in the transatlantic relations by demanding that
the EU lift its 1989 arms embargo.
The Debate over Lifting the
EU-Arms Embargo on China
and its Implication for the
Taiwan Strait conflict
In October 2003, China published an official
strategy paper on EU-China relations for the very
first time. This is interesting because Beijing did
not publish a similar paper on its relationship
with ASEAN, the USA or any other regional
grouping or great power. In this paper, Beijing
declared that it seeks to lift the EU ban on
arms exports to China “at an early date” in
order to “remove barriers to greater coopera-
tion on defence industry and technologies.”
Understandably, China wants to end the arms
embargo at a time when both sides see each
other increasingly as strategic partners in an era
of global uncertainties. Indeed, similar formal
embargos by the EU have only been adopted
against Sudan, Myanmar and Zimbabwe. China
does not want to belong to the same question-
able category of “rogue states.”
While China has become one of the fastest-grow-
ing economies worldwide, it has also developed
what is probably the third-largest defence budget
(after the US and Russia). During the six years
between 1997 and 2003, Chinese defence ex-
penditure increased by more than 140 per cent.
In 2004, official defence spending increased 11.
6 per cent to $25 billion (  20.8 billion), and in
2005 it increased by another 12.6 per cent to
around $29.5 billion - again outpacing the 2004
GDP increase of 9.5 per cent. However, the
Pentagon, the International Institute for Strate-
gic Studies (IISS, London) and international mili-
tary experts believe that in real terms the Chi-
nese defence budget is somewhere between
$50-90 billion. Since 2000, China has become
the world’s largest arms importer, with a heavy
dependence on Russian high-tech weaponry
exports due to its insufficient national arms in-
dustry output and the Western arms embargo.
It has signed new arms agreements worth more
than $11 billion since 1999. During the last two
years, the transparency of its defence expendi-
ture has also deteriorated, probably as the re-
sult of unwanted Western and Asian attention.
To understand Beijing’s interest in lifting the EU
arms embargo imposed in 1989, one needs to
bear in mind that President Vladimir Putin has
placed constraints on Russia’s weapon exports
and technology transfers to China. In contrast
to its growing military technology co-operation
with India, Moscow is not willing to develop new
high-tech weaponry generations together with
Beijing or to lease nuclear bombers and deliver
supersonic missiles with a range of more than
300-500 km to China. Thus China is looking for
alternatives to speed up its military moderniza-
tion and to diversify its arms imports and tech-
nology transfers.
Within the EU, France has clearly taken the lead
in pushing for the lifting of the 15-year-old
embargo, which it considers to be “outdated.”
This push reflects Paris’ and Beijing’s hopes for
a “multi-polar world,” as well as their intentions
to strengthen the French and European arms
industry by selling more weapons systems and
particularly dual-use technologies to China.
Furthermore, French President Jacques Chirac
has officially condemned Taiwan’s referendum
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of 2004 as “irresponsible” and a threat to Asia,
enshrined in a joint declaration signed by him
and visiting PRC President Hu Jintao. On 16
March 2004, Paris even held joint naval exer-
cises in the vicinity of Taiwan for the first time,
just four days before Taiwan’s presidential
elections. Beijing called these “the most com-
prehensive military exercise ever held between
China and a foreign country.” In February 2005,
the French defence minister, Michèle Alliot-Marie,
argued in favour of expanding weapons exports
to China over the next five years before Beijing
is able to produce them itself. According to her
arguments, lifting the embargo and expanded
weapons sales to China could slow Beijing’s own
capabilities to produce high-tech weaponry.
Hence lifting the embargo is better than main-
taining it. In April 2005, French Prime Minister
Jean-Pierre Raffarin stated during his visit to
China that Beijing’s new anti-secession law was
“completely compatible with the position of
France.” Finally, in the same month, China’s Air
Force Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Peng
Sheng-chu, declared “that his service felt con-
siderable pressure with the PLA planning to pur-
chase 210 advanced Mirage 2000-9CS” fighters
and 1,200 Mica air-to-air missiles, worth 12 bil-
lion euros.
In recent years, French President Jacques Chirac
and German’s then Chancellor Gerhard Schr?der
argued that China had made sufficient progress
in reforming its government and economy since
1989 to justify lifting the arms embargo.
Moreover, the European arms industry (including
the European Aeronautic Defence and Space
Company, EADS) has begun to shift its business
strategies towards the Asian markets, and par-
ticularly the Chinese one. Although the Euro-
pean industry often overestimates the prospects
of China’s willingness and capacity to buy large
amounts of high-tech weaponry, it is indeed very
interested in acquiring specific niche technolo-
gies and minor weapon systems, such as radar,
air-to-air missiles, sonar equipment, torpedoes
and other important force multipliers to increase
the fighting capabilities of both its old and new
weapons systems.
Germany and the EU have denied that the lift-
ing of the arms embargo would lead to a signifi-
cant rise in the sale of high-tech weaponry to
China because arms sales would still be barred
under a new, more efficient EU Code of Con-
duct aimed at preventing sales to repressive
states or instable areas. Furthermore, Germa-
ny’s national regulations on arms exports are
considered to be stricter than those of France
and the United Kingdom. Yet the German na-
tional export controls do not play an important
role any more for the weapons technology that
China is looking for. Moreover, the EU regula-
tions did not keep it from exporting naval ships
and other military equipment to Indonesia dur-
ing the 1990s when Jakarta occupied East Timor
(a former Portuguese colony) with brutal force.
During the last few years, other EU member
states have also adopted their own interpreta-
tions of the Code of Conduct in general and the
arms embargo vis-à-vis China in particular. These
have resulted in an increase in the number of
approved licences to sell military equipment to
China. Between 2002 and 2003, military exports
to China doubled from 210 to 416 million euros
and increased eight times within a two-year pe-
riod (2001-2003). As is hardly surprising, France
was the largest weapons exporter in 2003 with
sales to the value of 71 million euros.
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Unlike the embargo, the existing code is not le-
gally binding and its political restraints have
become insufficient. Also, the EU member states
(including France and Germany) did not address
the question of whether the Code of Conduct
was really effective enough to prevent the ex-
port not only of major weaponry, but also of
increasingly important dual-use technologies.
These dual-use technologies, which often don’t
meet the export-blocking criteria of being “lethal,”
nonetheless significantly augment China’s mili-
tary modernisation and power projection. In
contrast to the past, no major high-tech weap-
ons system today exists exclusively as a result
of purely military technologies.
Since the beginning of 2004, the US has launched
a diplomatic campaign against the EU as well as
its main EU and NATO partners, in order to pres-
sure them into not lifting the arms embargo on
China. The US is taking this action for four basic
reasons, which have found support across the
entire US political spectrum:
(1) If the EU lifted the embargo, it would put the
US in a precarious position to maintain its own
sanctions imposed in 1989.
(2) Although the human-rights situation in China
has undeniably improved since 1989, China’s
human-rights record is still questionable by US
standards. The Bush Administration, for
instance, sponsored a resolution at the UN
Commission on Human Rights in Geneva in
February 2004, condemning Beijing’s human
rights record for the first time in three years.
In the US view, China made commitments in
2002 which had not been fulfilled, such as
granting the International Committee of the
Red Cross access to its prisons - a promise
made on the eve of President’s Bill Clinton’s
first meeting with China’s President Jiang Zemin
over a decade ago.
(3) It would increase China’s military capabilities
and consequently destabilise the military
balance, which is already eroding in favour of
the PLA.
(4) Any weapons exports and technology trans-
fers may increase the proliferation risks due to
China’s inefficient export-control system.
On 2 February 2005, the US House of Repre-
sentatives approved a resolution condemning the
EU plan with an overwhelming 411 votes to 3.
Furthermore, the US Congress has threatened
to vote against any future transatlantic defence
co-operation as well as future access to US de-
fence technology for the EU and participation in
US defence projects if the embargo is lifted. Al-
though the US House of Representatives rejected
legislation that would have given the President
the authority to sanction EU companies that sell
arms to China on 14 July 2005, it may change
its mind if the EU lifts its arms ban in the future.
Originally, China feared that with the new East-
ern European members being politically more
closely allied with the US, it would be even more
difficult to lift the arms embargo. However, the
EU did not make a final decision prior to its en-
largement on 1 May 2004.
Meanwhile, the EU itself has demanded that China
should take more concrete steps towards the
improvement of human rights, such as ratifying
the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, which China signed in 1998. The European
Parliament already passed a resolution on 18
December 2003, appealing to the European
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Council and the EU member states not to lift the
EU embargo on arms sales to China by an over-
whelming majority of 373 to 32 with 29
abstentions. It has also argued that China has
not made enough progress in its human rights
record. The EP also reiterated its belief that in
view of China’s military threats against Taiwan
and by its unwillingness to dismantle its more
than 500 missiles that target the country, it would
be a bad idea to lift the arms embargo in the
near future. Moreover, on 3 June 2004, the WEU
Assembly and the Interparliamentary European
Security and Defence Assembly also issued a
warning against lifting the EU embargo on arms
exports to China until Beijing makes significant
progress on arms export controls and human
rights. It has criticized the human rights situation
in China, saying that it is worsening and that the
Chinese space programmes lack transparency in
their objectives. It has also demanded that China
ratify the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and formally join the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR). Beijing, however, made clear
that it will not bow to the demands of the EU for
any political concessions.
As the result of growing criticism and political
opposition, a new, more rigorous EU Code of
Conduct on arms sales is expected that will stop
any weapons exports that could be used by China
for “external aggression or internal repression.”
For the first time, the revised code will also gov-
ern licences and a “tool box” that will oblige all
member states to reveal what licences they have
approved and denied. However, it remains un-
certain whether the new Code of Conduct for
European arms exports would be effective
enough to close the loopholes for sensitive dual-
use technology exports.
On 14 March 2005, China adopted a new “anti-
separation law” authorizing the use of military
force against Taiwan if the island moves towards
formal independence or “should all other means
for a peaceful reunification be exhausted.”? Al-
though this threat is not really a new addition to
Beijing’s policies towards Taiwan, it is now en-
shrined in an official national law that limits the
political room for manoeuvre that Beijing’s po-
litical leaders will have in any escalating future
crisis with Taiwan even more. It also contradicts
Western concepts of crisis stability.
With the present British presidency and the EU’s
criticism of China’s new anti-separatist law, any
EU decision (which needs the agreement of all
25 EU member states) concerning the lifting of
the 1989 arms embargo seems likely to be
shelved for the time being.
In summary, the intra-European and transatlan-
tic discussions on lifting the EU arms embargo
on China, the French-German unilateral initia-
tive made without consulting their own foreign
ministries or major EU partners in advance, have
clearly demonstrated the short-sighted commer-
cial temptations wrapped up in the embargo
politics. For any final decision concerning the
lifting of the arms embargo, the German gov-
ernment should take into account that it would
also be politically responsible for any arms ex-
ports of other EU members, notably France, to
China. Moreover, opening the door for intended
or unintended EU military technology supplies
to China might also remove the existing restric-
tions on high-tech arms exports from Russia,
Israel and other nations to China.
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For many critics of lifting the arms embargo it is
far from clear that finalising technical prepara-
tions to ensure lift would not lead to a qualita-
tive or quantitative increase in arms sales. The
EU’s official position is still that an improvement
of the political atmosphere is a pre-condition for
lifting the embargo such as:
- Making progress on China’s human rights
situation;
- Working to improve cross-straits relations; and
- Improving the transparency of its military
transparency.
At present, it seems that there is no perspective
for lifting the embargo in the short-term future
for the following reasons:
- Is no longer a hot topic being discussed any
longer inside the EU;
- Germany’s stance which has changed (in the
early summer of 2005) already before the new
coalition government had been established;
- Chirac as a lame duck until the summer of
2007;
- Due to the overall much more critical atmos-
phere within the EU towards China.
In the medium term, however, the question as
to whether the EU should lift its 1989 embargo
no longer seems appropriate; the question is
really when will it be done and under what
circumstances. In the view of European critics
of the relationship with China, a responsible CFSP
should establish a direct link, not only between
lifting the embargo of 1989 and Chinese con-
cessions in the area of human rights, but also
concerning China’s authorized right to use mili-
tary means to “solve” the Taiwan question. This
right contradicts the EU’s repeatedly declared
strategic interest in a peaceful solution of the
Taiwan Strait conflict. Moreover, the EU has be-
come more critical of China’s “seduction strat-
egy” of “divide and rule” by playing off the USA
against the EU, which can only weaken the EU’s
CFSP vis-à-vis China and disrupt transatlantic
relations in ways that transcend this dispute over
the arms ban itself. Furthermore, the EU and
Germany have re-balanced their Asia policies in
a way which takes the views and interests of
the other Asian countries (notably the democ-
racies in the Asia-Pacific such as Japan, South
Korea, Australia, New Zealand and India) much
more into account and which is no longer so
dominated by the China factor as in the past.
The EU’s new China Strategy
Paper
The EU’s new China Strategy Paper, called “EU-
China: Closer Partners, Growing Responsi-
bilities”) formally adopted on October 24, 2006,
is a newly extended partnership and coopera-
tion agreement. The EU’s fundamental approach
remains one of engagement and cooperative
partnership. But the tone of the paper in general,
has become much more critical. In the view of
the European Commission, with a closer
partnership, mutual responsibilities increase too.
Trade and Investment - The
Economic Dimension of the
EU-China Strategy Paper
The attached trade and investment paper has
been called characteristically for the new critical
tone „Competition and Partnership“ which is re-
flecting the increasing ambivalent economic re-
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lationship between both sides. No doubt, both
sides have benefited from their growing eco-
nomic trade relationship. But trade imbalance
has also increased: Chinese exports in 2005
reached  158 bn and EU exports to China  52
bn, resulting in a trade deficit  106 bn. In the
view of the Commission, China has also grow-
ing responsibilities to maintain an open global
trading system and to trade fairly. The Commis-
sion argues that Europe should continue to of-
fer open and fair access to China’s exports and
to adjust to the competitive challenge, whilst
China should strengthening its commitment to
economic openness and market reform, improve
legal protection for foreign companies and re-
ject anti-competition trading policies and
practices. Otherwise tendencies in Europe and
US of growing defensiveness and protectionism
may rise. The Commission also tries to reassure
that the anti-dumping measures are only directed
against unfair trade, but not used to deflect fair
competition. Meanwhile, the EU’s market share
in China was 16% in 2005 (similar to that in
Japan a ASEAN countries, but lower than in US
with 20%, India with 21% or in Brazil with 31%.
At the same time, the Commission’s paper warns:
“China policies on the environment, social
standards, currency valuation and natural re-
source can distort trade”.
In this light, the new China Strategy paper adopts
a much tougher stance on issues such as are:
Government procurement; intellectual property;
subsidies; and the country’s lax environmental
and social standards. It also warns China that
its failure to dismantle market barriers and tackle
intellectual property violations risks undermin-
ing the booming mutual trade. This criticism is
also reflecting growing political pressure inside
the EU that its trade relationship with Beijing
may not be seen as genuinely reciprocal in the
future if current political trends will continue and
problems won’t be addressed.
Political Side
The Commission’s paper seeks a comprehensive
reframing approach to its political and economic
partnership. For the EU’s official standpoint,
despite growing global political role and emerg-
ing economic superpower status, China remains
a developing country for the time being. In the
Commission’s view, both sides have a mutual
interest at a strong partnership and sustained
dialogue as well as a shared responsibility in the
following fields:
- to address climate change, sustainable devel-
opment and energy security;
- to work more closely on issues such as devel-
opment assistance in Africa;
- Europe’s interest at supporting internal reform
processes in China (i.e. tackle corruption).
However, the paper also raised further criticism
at China at the following issues:
- China’s Africa-policies undermining EU’s devel-
oping policies;
- Increasing concern over the lack of transpar-
ency in Beijing’s defence spending;
- EU should improve its analytical capacity on
China’s military development;
But it calls for continued cooperation on the
Galileo global positioning satellite system, de-
spite the fact that Jacques Barrot, EU transport
commissioner, has admitted in September 2006
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that the project could have military uses.
For the EU, China’s traditional preference of strict
non-interference becomes increasingly untenable
and is complicating regional and global crisis
management. In this context, it is notable that
China takes a more active, but also more asser-
tive international role. Most worrisome for China,
however, might be the EU’s new clear position
on Taiwan. In this regard, the paper argues:
- EU has significant stake in the maintenance of
cross-straits peace and stability;
- opposition to any measure which would
amount to a unilateral change of the status
quo;
- strong opposition to the use of force;
- encouragement for pragmatic solutions and
CBMs;
- support for dialogue between all parties; and
- continuing strong economic and trade links with
Taiwan.
Conclusions and Perspectives
For the debate on lifting the EU arms embargo
it is necessary to understand on the Chinese side
that the EU’s changing stance is not just the
result of US pressure. The former German Chan-
cellor Gerhard Schröder had never a majority in
the Bundestag or even in its own party. For the
EU, ultimately the debate helped to highlight
other aspects than economic factors to get a
more comprehensive picture on China’s rise and
to define EU’s strategic interests vis-à-vis China
in a more comprehensive way, including in the
framework of its CFSP and a more balanced Asian
policy. Any lifting of the arms embargo is de-
pendent on pre-conditions which China needs
to fullfill and a change of the overall atmosphere
within the EU-China relations. The EU’s new
China Strategy Paper is not really making China
to the scapegoat of the EU’s own lack of inter-
nal reforms to compete successfully in times of
globalization, albeit those Europeans problems
of the lack of reforms is certainly influencing the
EU-China relations. But there are undoubtedly
double standards on the Chinese side in context
of its WTO obligations. In general, the new Strat-
egy paper reflects the need for a deepening EU-
China dialogue, but as well as of a strategic tri-
angle relationship between the EU-China and the
United States. In the future, any EU- China policy
will be a mix of four major elements:
- economic factors;
- domestic policies (growing uncertainties and
social fears);
- world order considerations; and
- determinants of regional order and security.
However, there is also much more agreement
within the EU about general assumptions and
strategies of its China-policies. At the same time,
there is a need to prevent that the EU-China
relationship moves from one extreme to the
other one. A more balanced relationship needs
to take into account the common interests as
well as their different attitudes, policies and
underlying values.
In this light, this analysis concludes with the
following political recommendations:
* initiating a deeper dialogue on controversial
issues:
* joint discussions on China’s energy and natu-
ral resource policies and energy foreign poli-
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cies/diplomacies (Africa-policies, Central Asia)
- including political stability in the energy/natu-
ral resource producer states;
* climate change/environmental policies;
* addressing trade imbalance and dismantle
market barriers i.e. (intellectual property
rights);
* effective multilateralism of ineffective multilat-
eral regimes and organizations (global
governance);
* transparency of China’s military and defence
expenditures.
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